by Lee Gesmer | Apr 24, 2013 | What Were They Thinking
I haven’t written a post that falls in the “what were they thinking” category for quite a while, but you don’t see this very often.
In Angiodynamics v. Biolitec AG Massachusetts federal district court judge Michael Ponsor (pictured left) entered a preliminary injunction forbidding the defendant from entering into a merger with its German subsidiary corporation, so as not to put the company’s assets outside the reach of the plaintiff. In addition to corporate defendants, the corporate defendant’s CEO, Wolfgang Neuberger, was named as an individual defendant.
The injunction order was appealed, and the First Circuit upheld the injunction. The defendant then went forward with the merger in direct violation of the court’s order.
When Judge Ponsor received the plaintiff’s motion for contempt he ordered that Mr. Neuberger appear at the hearing on that motion. Neuberger declined to attend on the grounds that he was “afraid that the Court may . . . incarcerate him.”
Based on my experience with Judge Ponsor, he is a relatively easy-going, patient judge (as federal judges go). Not in this case. In response to the plaintiff’s motion for contempt he wrote that the defendant violated the injunction “in every way it could be violated: text, substance, spirit, body, and soul.” Judge Ponsor has been on the federal bench for 25 years. He wrote that the defendants’ conduct “constitutes the most flagrantly offensive violation of a court order that this court has personally encountered.”
Judge Ponsor entered an order that, in its severity, is unprecedented in my experience:
First, he ordered that a warrant be issued for the arrest of Wolfgang Neuberger. He stated that “the court asks the marshals to do everything possible to ensure that the warrant is effectuated internationally and Neuberger is brought to stand before this court.” This warrant is not to be taken lightly. In 2012 the U.S. Marshall Service arrested 36,200 federal fugitives. The Marshall Service “sees to it that there is no safe haven for criminals who flee the territorial boundaries of the United States.” Germany will not extradite a German citizen to the U.S. for criminal prosecution, but Neuberger is subject to arrest in many other countries that do have extradition treaties with the U.S.
Second, he ordered that the defendants be fined as follows: $1 million on May 10; $2 million on June 1; $4 million on July 1; $8 million on August 1 and on the first of each month thereafter. These fines will continue until the merger is reversed and the status quo ante restored. Likewise, only then will Mr. Neuberger be released from prison (assuming he is apprehended).
Third, Judge Ponsor has requested that the U.S. Attorney’s Office prosecute Neuberger for criminal contempt.
In the meantime, the fines ordered by Judge Ponsor will continue to accumulate unless and until the merger is reversed. Whether the plaintiff will be able to enforce those fines in Germany is an open (and doubtlessly difficult) question. However, a judgment against Biolitec (whether to enforce the fines or, perhaps, a default judgment) would be a serious obstacle to the company ever selling products (lasers and laser delivery systems) in the U.S. in the future, since the plaintiff could attach or trustee process any monies owed to Biolitec by an entity in the U.S.
Bottom line, Biolitec should reverse that merger post haste. What were they thinking?
Angiodynamics v. Biolitec AG (April 11, 2013)
by Lee Gesmer | Apr 21, 2013 | Copyright
The copyright content industry has launched two no-holds-barred legal challenges against non-piratical websites that host third-party videos. That is, service providers whose intent is not obviously to induce or encourage copyright infringement and that follow the “notice and take down” rules of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Until last Thursday the outcome had been a complete loss for the content industry in one case, UMG v. Veoh (9th Cir. 2013). In the second case, Viacom v. YouTube, the content owners were hanging on by their fingernails following an adverse summary judgment ruling by Southern District of New York District Court Judge Louis Stanton in 2010, followed by a largely (but not entirely) affirming decision by the Second Circuit in 2012. However, following Judge Stanton’s post-remand decision, issued on April 18, 2013, the content owners are left with a complete loss in the second case as well. Absent another appeal to the Second Circuit, Viacom v. YouTube is over.
The outcome of these two cases in the influential Second and Ninth Circuits is not only a loss for the copyright owners, but a significant level of clarification as to what hosting sites such as YouTube and Veoh should do to ward off future attempts to pierce the copyright liability safe harbors created by the DMCA.
The conclusion of the YouTube case (assuming no further appeal) is particularly significant. When Google purchased Youtube for $1.65 billion in 2006 it took a huge legal risk that it would be responsible for copyright infringement damages of as much as six times that amount.*
*Viacom alleged infringement of 63,060 video clips. Assuming the videos had been timely registered, at the maximum statutory damages of $150,000 per clip, the theoretical damages in the case exceeded $9.4 billion.
Last week’s district court decision shows that Viacom did not come close to prevailing on the issues that were the subject of the Second Circuit’s remand.
Did YouTube Have Knowledge or Awareness of Specific Infringements? The Second Circuit instructed the district court to determine whether YouTube actually knew of (or was willfully blind to) specific instances of infringement of video clips at issue in the case, or whether there were facts or circumstances indicating such specific infringement. Viacom was unable to do so. In fact, Viacom admitted that “neither side possesses the kind of evidence that would allow a clip-by-clip assessment of actual knowledge.” Judge Stanton rejected Viacom’s argument that the burden fell on YouTube to prove lack of knowledge (in effect to prove the negative), stating that the foundation for this argument was an “anachronistic,” pre-DMC concept. Given the DMCA’s statutory scheme—which places the burden on copyright holders to provide a statutory “take down” notice—the burden of showing that YouTube knew of or was aware of specific infringements could not be shifted to YouTube to disprove.
Did YouTube Willfully Blind Itself to Specific Infringement? The Second Circuit held that “the willful blindness doctrine may be applied, in appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement under the DMCA.” This may have been the most controversial aspect of the Second Circuit’s 2012 decision. Not only is the doctrine vague, but it seems inconsistent with the DMCA’s “notice-and-takedown” procedure. The Second Circuit’s holding suggests that awareness of specific infringement may lead to infringement liability even in the absence of a take-down notice.
On remand Judge Stanton construed the Second Circuit’s holding narrowly: he held that “willful blindness” required blindness to “specific and identifiable instances of infringement.” He found that the specific locations of the infringements (the URLs) were not provided, and YouTube had no duty to look for infringing clips, even among a number as small as 450 clips. Nevertheless, the fact that the Second Circuit imported a “willful blindness” standard into the DMCA remains one of the most troubling “here be dragons”* aspects of the DMCA, and is the most obvious basis for an appeal by Viacom.
*”Here be dragons” refers to the medieval practice of putting dragons, sea serpents and other mythological creatures in uncharted areas of maps. As noted above, parts of the DMCA still remain unexplored. They are “terra incognita.”
Did YouTube Have the “Right and Ability to Control” Infringing Activity? By this point in the decision Viacom was no longer hanging on by its fingernails, it was in free fall. Judge Stanton reviewed the precedents in which service providers have been found to control infringing activity (Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures (service provider provided detailed instructions regarding layout, appearance and content); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster (“purposeful , culpable expression and conduct” might rise to level of control under DMCA)),* and found that YouTube’s conduct satisfied neither of these standards. YouTube’s decision to exclude whole movies and TV shows, nudity and pornography, along with several other content catagories, did not rise to the level where YouTube had the right and ability to control infringing activity.
*The “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct” standard is another troublesome interpretation of the law in the Second Circuit. However, It shouldn’t be difficult for service providers to stay on the safe side of this line by avoiding the types of encouragement or inducement of infringing behavior that typified Grokster and similar cases.
Did Youtube Improperly Syndicate Clips to Third Parties? YouTube did deliver some video clips to Verizon Wireless, but they were not the clips-in-suit. Apparently some clips-in-suit were provided to Apple, AT&T and others, but this was done at the direction of users in order to enable people to access the videos in various mobiles formats. The court found this process is protected under the DMCA
Implications of YouTube and Veoh. The online copyright infringement liability provisions of the DMCA comprise a singularly complex set of rules for online copyright infringement where the offending works are posted by third parties. This amendment to the Copyright Act was signed into law in late 1998, before music and video sharing were even a twinkle in the eyes of Internet entrepreneurs. The first music file sharing system, Napster, was not released until mid-1999, and YouTube not until 2005. Neither Congress nor the copyright content industries foresaw these technologies and their impact in 1998. As a result, interpretation and application of the DMCA has been a legal battleground for the last 13 years. At first, lawsuits by the copyright content industry were like taking candy from babies—early entrepreneurs lacked the legal sophistication to avoid liability for copyright infringement, and they were easily mowed down by industry lawsuits. The Napster (2001), Aimster (2003) and Grokster (2005) cases are representative of “the early years” of DMCA litigation. The second generation cases—Veoh and YouTube, present a completely different picture. Today, it’s hard to imagine that anyone with competent legal representation would make the mistakes made by Napster, Aimster and Grokster. While, as discussed above, the “here be dragons” label may still apply to some parts of the DMCA safe harbor map, the YouTube and Veoh cases have illuminated enough of the map that online service providers can stay well clear of potential liability for third-party content, and last week’s decision in YouTube only adds to this body of knowledge.
by Lee Gesmer | Apr 16, 2013 | Copyright
Copyright owners who wish to file mass copyright suits based on a “BitTorrent Swarm” joinder theory—cases in which dozens (sometime hundreds) of anonymous defendants are joined in a single suit and then identified by serving subpoenas on their ISPs—are not welcome in Massachusetts.
I’ve written about the phenomenon of BitTorrent swarm mass copyright suits before, but it looks like the door has been all but closed to these cases in the District of Massachusetts. As a reminder, here’s how these cases work.
Assume you are the CFO of an adult movie publisher. Sales aren’t doing very well (given all the free porn on the Internet), and you’re under pressure to increase revenues. You hear about a gambit used by some other adult movie companies, and you decide to give it a try.
You know your movies are being downloaded from the Internet, infringing your copyrights. You sue a group of downloaders, all of whom are part of the same “Bit Torrent Swarm,” as “Does”—that is, anonymous defendants whose names will be substituted into the suit at a later date. You contend that the fact they are part of the same “swarm” justifies joining them all in a single case.*
*This argument relies on Rule 20(a)(1)) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows multiple defendants to be joined in a single case where the claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” The plaintiffs in this line of cases argue that the members of the same BitTorrent swarm fall under this rule, and therefore are properly joined.
This is is very efficient for you, since if you filed a separate suit against each defendant you’d have to pay a $350 filing fee in each case, while one suit against multiple defendants requires a one-time filing fee of $350. Not only do you save the cost of multiple filing fees, but you achieve economies of scale in the litigation itself by minimizing court appearances, consolidating discovery, and possibly conducting a single trial.
After filing suit* you request a subpoena from the court ordering the downloaders’ ISPs to disclose the downloaders’ names and addresses to you. Then, before you substitute each downloader’s real name into the lawsuit (thereby, presumably, causing the downloader no end of public scorn and humiliation), you let him or her know the suit is coming and settle each claim for five thousand dollars. Five grand here, five grand there, pretty soon you’re talking real money.
*Here is an example of a complaint showing how the anonymous defendants are identified by IP address.
Sounds too good to be true, and in Massachusetts it may be. Apart from the fact that a lot of defendants don’t roll over as easily as you might hope (“either I pay you five grand or you’re gonna tell my old lady and my employer? That’s an easy choice, dude. Can I give you their numbers?”), the Massachusetts federal judges just don’t cotton to this use of the courts. Last Fall I posted on an October 12, 2012 decision by U.S. District Court Judge William Young, who ruled that Third Degree Films could not sue 47 “Does” in one case and then use the court’s subpoena power to discover their identities. He held that Third Degree Films would have to file a separate lawsuit against each defendant. Third Degree could not use Rule 20 joinder to create a “low-cost, low-risk revenue model for the adult film companies.”*
*An earlier decision by Judge Young in this case is here.
At almost the time, on October 10, 2012, Massachusetts U.S. District Court Judge Richard Stearns dismissed a mass copyright infringement case (New Sensations, Inc. v. Does 1-201, Sept. 21. 2012), ordering that the cases be defended and litigated in separate causes of action. The same month Massachusetts U.S. District Court Judge F. Dennis Saylor issued a similar order in Third Degree Films v. Does 1-72 and Massachusetts Chief Magistrate Sorkin issued an order to show cause in a mass copyright case against 29 anonymous defendants. (Discount Video Center v. Does 1-29). In something of an understatement, Magistrate Sorkin noted that the “landscape has changed in several material respects” when it comes to the issue of joinder in mass copyright cases.
More recently, Massachusetts U.S. District Court Judge Mark Wolf signaled solidarity with these judges, questioning the right of adult film companies to use “mass copyright infringement lawsuits” to identify anonymous Doe defendants “intending to send demand letters and achieve prompt settlements for limited amounts rather than intending to actually litigate the claims asserted.”
In one case (Exquisite Media v. Does 1-35), Judge Wolf ordered the film company to address, by January 31, 2013, the legal issues implicated by Exquisite’s joinder of 35 anonymous defendants in one lawsuit (an “order to show cause”). Exquisite failed to respond, and on April 12th,Judge Wolf dismissed the case as to all 35 Does. In a second case assigned to Judge Wolf, Kick Ass Pictures v. Does 1-25, the movie publisher filed Doe suits against 25 anonymous defendants. Again, Judge Wolf issued an order to show cause. Kick Ass, like Exquisite Media, failed to respond, and on April 12th Judge Wolf dismissed this case as well.
The message is clear: the District of Massachusetts is not a receptive venue for adult film companies seeking to file mass copyright cases joining multiple defendants based on the BitTorrent swarm theory.*
*This post has not attempted to collect every mass copyright BitTorrent case in Massachusetts.
by Lee Gesmer | Apr 2, 2013 | General
As I reluctantly predicted last week, U.S District Court Judge Richard Sullivan has ruled that Redigi’s digital resale business is not protected by the first sale doctrine. His March 30, 2013 decision falls squarely in line with the arguments made by Capitol Records and rejects all of Redigi’s positions.
I have written quite a bit on this case (here and here), and there is nothing new or surprising in the court’s decision. The court described the issue before it as “the novel question . . . whether a digital music file, lawfully made and purchased, may be resold by its owner through ReDigi under the first sale doctrine.” In answering this question the court emphasized that because it is “a court of law and not a congressional subcommittee or technology blog, the issues are narrow, technical, and purely legal.” Indeed, the court hewed closely to the statute. It noted that “the plain text of the Copyright Act makes clear that reproduction occurs when a copyright work is fixed in a new material object.”* The court states that “put another way, the first sale defense is limited to material items, like records, that the copyright owner put into the stream of commerce. Here, ReDigi is not distributing such material items; rather, it is distributing reproductions of the copyrighted code embedded in new material objects, namely, the ReDigi server in Arizona and its users’ hard drives.”
*This includes phonorecords, which are the “material objects in which sounds . . . are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
The court rejected Redigi’s claim that files on users’ computers are “migrated” to the Redigi server. It found that when a user downloads a digital music file it is “reproduce[d]” on a new phonorecord within the meaning of the Copyright Act. When that user moves the file to the Redigi server the “file has moved from one material object – the user’s computer – to another – the ReDigi server – [and therefore] an [unauthorized] reproduction has occurred.” The court rejected the argument that Redigi’s system is protected under copyright fair use, noting that Capitol does not (in this case) challenge the use of cloud-based storage lockers for personal use or convenience. “Capitol asserts only that uploading to and downloading from the Cloud Locker incident to sale fall outside the ambit of fair use. The Court agrees.”
The court concluded that Redigi is liable for direct, secondary, contributory and vicarious infringement.
According to Time magazine online, Redigi has a new and different technology that was not at issue in the case (Redigi 2.0) and plans to appeal the March 30th decision. However, here is where Redigi will find itself deep in the weeds of federal civil procedure, which presents a new set of problems. The case is not over, and among other things Redigi faces a trial on damages, which could be as much as $150,000 per infringement. We don’t know what Redigi’s sales volume is, but it’s hard to think that Redigi’s potential liability will not reach millions of dollars. However, unless an injunction is issued (the court’s opinion was not accompanied by an injunction), any appeal may have to await final judgment, which will incude damages (and potentially Capitol’s attorney’s fees). However, Redigi will not be permitted to initiate an appeal unless it firsts posts a bond in the amount of the judgment. Typically, a small start-up like Redigi can obtain a bond only by providing the bonding company a cash amount equal to the bond. It seems unlikely that Redigi has sufficient assets to afford a bond to cover a large judgment.
In addition, Capitol may seek leave of court to add as defendants the individual owners and employees of Redigi that exercised control over or benefited from the infringement. While Redigi could oppose such as motion as coming too late in the case, a decision would be at the discretion of the judge. As Capitol Records showed in its copyright suit against MP3tunes and Michael Robertson, Capitol is not above suing not only corporate infringers but their founders and owners. (See: The Record Labels Want My Minivan).* The philosophy of the record companies in many copyright cases may best be described as, “never kick a man when he’s down, unless that’s the only way to keep him there.” Capitol may be preparing to put on its steel toe boots in this case.
*In the MP3tunes case Capitol insisted on proceeding against Robertson even after Mp3tunes filed for bankruptcy.
According to the court decision Redigi consulted legal counsel before launching Redigi and engaging the recording industry in a test case. One can only hope that the attorneys Redigi consulted reminded Redigi of the Chinese proverb, “A piece of paper, blown by the wind into a law court, may in the end only be drawn out again by two oxen.”
by Lee Gesmer | Apr 1, 2013 | Copyright
Do you think U.S. copyright law protects the author of this news snippet from copying? –
Job seekers can roll the dice to land work at another of the four casinos coming soon to Ohio. Hollywood Casino Toledo has posted more than 600 job listings on its website this week. . . . restaurant workers, slots and table games supervisors, groundskeepers and security officers. The casino is scheduled to open in the spring with . . .
How about this one? –
The military intelligence complex an hour outside Washington where the WikiLeaks case goes to court this week is known as a cloak-and-dagger sanctum off-limits to the public — a reputation that’s only partly true. . . . low-level clearance and a Lady Gaga CD. The prosecution can only hope that their arguments, or the evidence, will reveal the secrets of how, . . .
Would it make a difference if you knew that the 58 words in first excerpt are taken from a 109 word article, and the 61 words in the second article from a 540 word article, and that both articles were (as they appear) factual news pieces?
People constantly ask “how much can I copy and be safe” under copyright law? Thirty seconds from a several minute piece of music? 10% of a news article?*
*The “10% rule” and “30 second rule” have become the equivalent of legal urban legends. Neither has a basis under U.S. copyright law.
The answers to these questions are most often determined by application of the copyright doctrine of “fair use,” which is codified in the Copyright Act in 17 U.S.C. § 107. The question of whether 13 news excerpts (including the two above) copied from Associated Press violate AP’s copyright or are protected by fair use is the issue facing Judge Denise Cote, a highly experienced federal trial judge in the Southern District of New York in The Associated Press v. Meltwater US Holdings, Inc.
Fair use is a frequently litigated issue, and the outcome in any given case can be notoriously unpredictable. As the U.S. Copyright Office puts it, “The distinction between what is fair use and what is infringement in a particular case will not always be clear or easily defined.” This is something of an understatement. It’s not for nothing that copyright law has been described as one of the most metaphysical areas of the law, requiring distinctions that are very subtle and refined. Some cases involving fair use are black and white, but fair use is an ad hoc, case specific doctrine, and in many cases the outcome is often more in the eye of the beholder (usually the judge) than in the law books.
In the Meltwater case the defendant, Meltwater US Holdings, operates an online news clipping service similar to traditional, paper-based news clipping services. Meltwater scans 162,000 online news websites daily (who know there were so many?) and indexes and archives their content. AP holds the copyright to many of the news articles copied by Meltwater.
Meltwater’s paying customers provide it with keywords. If an article contains a hit, Meltwater sends its customer verbatim excerpts of the article, typically consisting of the headline, the lede (the opening sentence), a “Hit Sentence” (based on the search criteria) and a link to the original article. Customers can receive daily reports or do ad hoc searches. However, discovery showed that subscribers click-through to see the original article less than 1% of the time.
Meltwater did not seriously deny that it copied the 13 verbatim excerpts at issue and provided them to its subscribers in this manner. Depending on the length of the original AP article, the amount copied (based on word count) ranged from 4.5% to over 60% of the AP article. Nor did Meltwater argue that the AP articles were not protected by copyright law. Meltwater’s defense centered on its argument that it was protected from AP’s claim of copyright infringement under the doctrine of fair use.
This defense was soundly rejected by Judge Cote, who found that Meltwater had put the excerpts of the AP articles to commercial use (Meltwater and AP are competitors), that Meltwater’s use of the AP articles cheapened the value of AP’s work, that by copying the title, lede and materials surrounding the targeted keyword Meltwater had copied a qualitatively significant part of the AP articles (the “heart of the story”), and that Meltwater’s use of the AP stories was not transformative.*
*Transformative use is often an important consideration under the fair use doctrine. The judge did find that the fact that the material copied involved current news was a factor that favored Meltwater under the four-part fair use analysis.
The judge also rejected Meltwater’s contention that it is a search engine (akin to Google), noting (among other things) that Meltwater is a for-pay subscription service (Google is free, although it is advertiser supported), and that the click-through rate on Google News is over 60%, compared with a click-through rate of under 1% for Meltwater, suggesting that Meltwater does not perform a search function, but actually provides the information sought by its subscribers.
This decision is an important fair use precedent for news aggregators, but it is likely to be limited (if upheld on appeal) to cases involving verbatim copying of qualitatively important news content. Other public (non-subscription) news aggregators are much more careful about how much they copy. Sites such as Drudge Report and The Huffington Post are careful to provide very brief descriptions of news articles (including AP articles) to which they link. In the meantime other subscriber-based closed systems like Meltwater (who may have already heard from AP and might have been awaiting this ruling before deciding which way to jump) will need to refine their systems in light of this decision, or risk defending their position in court, with Meltwater as a precedent.*
*The Southern District of New York is one of the busiest, and most influential, courts in the U.S. when it comes to copyright law.
While Meltwater may be planning an appeal and hoping the Second Circuit will see the case more favorably toward Meltwater, at present it is in a legally awkward position, to say the least. The 13 articles AP sued on are only the tip of the iceberg, and if Meltwater chooses to continue to distribute excerpts from AP articles it risks multiplying its damages by as much as $150,000/infringement if AP registers its articles with the Copyright Office (as it did with the 13 articles at issue in the case). If the court orders an injunction Meltwater will be able to appeal the injunction while the issue of damages goes to trial, but even that will shut Meltwater down (at least as to AP articles) for the year or so it takes for the Second Circuit to hear and decide the case. It customers may cancel their subscriptions and demand refunds (or stop purchasing subscriptions) if AP news excerpts are excluded from Meltwater’s service. So, if AP articles are important to Meltwater (as they appear to be, based on the decision), it is in a tight spot.
Of course, Meltwater has a theoretical workaround to the outcome in this case, albeit it won’t be able to use its web crawler to implement it. Meltwater would have to rely on its employees to review AP articles and summarize them using language original to Meltwater rather than AP. However, this expensive, labor-intensive alternative would undermine Meltwater’s business model, which relies on a low-cost, computer-automated process.
The decision also addresses Meltwater’s argument that AP’s failure to use the Robot Exclusion Standard (robots.txt) constitutes implied consent (it does not), that AP has engaged in copyright misuse (it has not), and that AP’s claims are barred by equitable estoppel (they are not). However, clearly the heart of this decision is the court’s ruling on fair use.
The Associated Press v. Meltwater US Holdings, Inc.
