by Lee Gesmer | Apr 16, 2008 | Readings and Novelties
Humor is just another defense against the universe.
Mel Brooks
Legal humor is almost always an oxymoron, but Evan Schaeffer, author of The Legal Underground blog, had me in silent hysterics (I was in the office) with his list of 17 types of lawyers. The descriptions are so cleverly written, and so on point, that … well, enough, here they are, with links :
Types of Lawyers #1: The Big Firm Summer Associate
Types of Lawyers #2: The Partner Who Talks Too Fast
Types of Lawyers #3: The Lawyer Who Advertises on TV
Types of Lawyers #4: The Lawyer Who Carries Another Lawyer’s Briefcase
Types of Lawyers #5: The Lawyer Who Brings Her Breast Pump to the Office
Types of Lawyers #6: The Mafia Lawyer
Types of Lawyers #7: The Modest Lawyer
Types of Lawyers #8: The Partner Who Golfs
Types of Lawyers #9: The Lawyer on the Run
Types of Lawyers #10: The Lawyer Who’s in the Wrong Profession
Types of Lawyers #11: The Lawyer from the Planet Og
Types of Lawyers #12: The Lawyer Who’s Writing a Legal Thriller
Types of Lawyers #13: The Stereotypical Lawyer
Types of Lawyers #14: The Lawyer Who’s on The Apprentice
Types of Lawyers #15: The Associate Who Knew Where the Bodies Were Buried
Types of Lawyers #16: The Lawyer with the Shiny New Gadget
Types of Lawyers #17: The Associate Who Finally Gets a Chance to Meet the Senior Partner
I think there are probably a few more kinds — the “ultra-high testosterone” lawyer, the “how did he pass the bar exam?” lawyer, the “lawyer who seeks to intimidate,” the “name dropping lawyer (judges, of course),” the “lawyer with absolutely no sense of humor,” the “lawyer who doesn’t own a TV and is inordinately proud of it” — and so forth, but to go much further is tiresome. Seventeen is probably about right.
If we can’t laugh at ourselves, we’re missing the easiest targets. The full blog entry is here.
by Lee Gesmer | Apr 7, 2008 | Copyright
Nancy Gertner is no shrinking violet. Her reputation as a lawyer and then as a judge who is willing to make hard decisions and challenge the status quo is well known.
Last week she did just this when she quashed the RIAA‘s subpoena against Boston University, which was targeted at learning the identities of some Boston University students who had posted copyrighted songs. Her rationale was that there was no clear evidence the students had violated the Copyright Act, and therefore their identies should be protected. Specifically, she found that “publication” (that is, posting the tunes online) was not the same as “distribution” (that is, the tune was downloaded). No evidence of download, no violation. However, whether this ruling will become the prevalent rule under copyright law remains to be seen.
The 52 page decision in Sire Records, Inv. v. Does 1-21 is available here.
The estimable and erudite copyright scholar William Paltry discusses this case, and two others that raise similar issues, in more detail on his blog here.
by Lee Gesmer | Apr 7, 2008 | Noncompete Agreements
Here is Judge Gorton’s decision in Bear Stearns v. Sharon, which I discussed last week. Bear Stearns’ motion for a preliminary injunction was denied. Thanks to Michael Boudett (who represented Sharon) at Foley Hoag for providing me with this decision.
by Lee Gesmer | Mar 31, 2008 | Noncompete Agreements
Recognizing that the Massachusetts Suffolk Business Litigation Session (BLS) is an unreceptive venue for securities firms attempting to enforce restrictive coveneants against former employees, Bear Stearns has sued the former Executive Director of its Private Client Services Group in Federal District Court in Boston. The employee, a 20 year veteran of Bear Stearns, fled to Morgan Stanley on Monday, March 17, 2008, the day after Bear Stearns’ $2/share bail-out sale to Morgan Stanley was announced.
The Bear Stearns employee, Douglas Sharon, had an agreement with Bear Stearns that required him to provide 90 days notice of resignation. According to Bear Stearns, Sharon provided notice and left on the same day. Moroever, Bear Stearns asserts that Sharon took confidential and trade secret customer/client information with him, much of which was copied the weekend just prior to March 17th. Then, according to Bear Stearns, he used this information to contact his former clients at Bear Stearns.
As noted in the link above, the BLS (where this case would have ended up had Bear Stearns filed in state court) has been less than friendly to “broker” suits of this ilk. Apparently, Bear Stearns is hoping it will get better treatment in federal court, where its case has been assigned to Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton.
While a full hearing on Bear Stearns’ motion for preliminary injunction has not yet occurred, Judge Gorton did enter a temporary restraining order preventing Mr. Sharon from working for Morgan Stanley, communicating with his former clients, or inducing any Bear Stearns employees to leave Bear Stearns in favor of Morgan Stanley, pending the full court hearing.
Whether this order holds up on full hearing remains to be seen. Bear Stearns was right to be nervous about presenting this agreement to a BLS judge, such as Judge Ralph Gants. Mr. Sharon’s agreement is not a “covenant not to noncompete”; it is merely a notice period. If the 90 day notice period is intended to allow Bear Stearns to transition Mr. Sharon’s work to new employees with his cooperation, the cost of having someone else undertake that task may be adequate damages to compensate Bear Stearns under the contract, and an injunction would be inappropriate.
In state court, Mr. Sharon would appear to have a good argument that while he may be liable for some damages, he should not be enjoined from working for a competitor. Given the possibility that Mr. Sharon is being paid a $10 million signing bonus by Morgan Stanley (according to the Bear Stearns’ complaint), he should be willing to suffer what would, by comparison, be a slap on the hand.
Moreover, Mr. Sharon can use the arguments used to great effect in recent BLS cases, including the argument that preventing him from providing brokerage services to his former Bear Stearns clients will be harmful to those clients, and therefore the noncompete sought by Bear Stearns is against public policy.
However, federal judges are a breed apart from state judges. While they are bound to apply state law, they have a lot of discretion in a case of this sort. Whether Judge Gorton choses to apply the agreement liberally or conservatively remains to be seen.
The complaint is here. Bear Stearns’ preliminary injunction motion is here. And Judge Gorton’s temporary Order is here.
by Lee Gesmer | Mar 12, 2008 | Noncompete Agreements
In contast to the Suffolk Business Litigation noncompete cases discussed below, in National Engineering v. Grogan Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Maureen B. Hogan, sitting in Middlesex County, enforced a six month noncompete provision between a recruiting and staffing firm, and its former employee, Travis Grogan.
The heart of Judge Hogan’s decision is as follows:
Other than his employment at NESC, had no experience in the staffing industry. All of his knowledge of the business was gained through training provided by NESC and by working at NESC. His relationships with the customers and accounts of NESC were all developed and maintained while he was employed at NESC, through use of the resources and confidential information of NESC. The success of NESC’s business is grounded upon relationships and good will with its corporate customers and Managed Service Providers, developed through its sales executives, such as Grogan. NESC is entitled to protect its good will and relationships with its customers and accounts through the non-compete covenants to which agreed. These covenants restrict from engaging in competition with NESC and from soliciting and/or servicing its clients and accounts for a reasonable period of time-one year. The general non-competition covenant which restricts from working for a competitor within 50 miles of the office or area in which he worked while at NESC is also reasonable in scope. These covenants do not restrict from using his own skills, knowledge or talent, but rather prevent him from trading on the good will of NESC by restricting him from using the relationships he developed with NESC’s customers, clients and accounts and the confidential information of NESC, including knowledge of these customers and their needs.
Would this case have been decided differently in the Suffolk BLS? One wonders ….
A link to the full case is here.